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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines in detail the previously unexamined phenomenon of 
seasoned equity issuance by closed-end funds. Evidence presented here indicates that 
closed-end funds issue equity at a much higher occurrence rate than is the case for regular, 
operating firms in the US. Furthermore, these funds overwhelmingly use the rights offer 
method o f equity floatation, which, outside the closed-end universe, has rarely been used 
in the US in recent years.
The evidence produced by this study indicates that, in contrast to industrial firms, 
the shares of closed-end funds show no significant reaction to announcements o f either 
rights offerings or firm commitment offerings. This is consistent with adverse selection 
models o f securities issuance. However, contrary to these models, closed-end funds also 
display strong price runups prior to issue, in both absolute and relative (relative to the 
market) terms, as evidenced in part by significant positive movements in fund discounts in 
the year prior to issue.
Closed-end fund rights offerings frequently involve nontransferable rights, an 
important feature which is exceedingly rare outside the closed-end universe. This 
nontransferability feature, when matched up with otherwise similar but transferable rights 
offerings, affords the opportunity to test for temporary price pressure in these securities 
events. Although the significant negative returns found during the offering periods are 
consistent with temporary price pressure, the very weak price rebound observed after the 
completion of the offers is more supportive o f a permanent price pressure effect on the 
shares o f closed-end funds that issue additional shares in equity offerings.
vi
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CHAPTER 1. AN OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation looks at what happens when a closed-end fund returns to the 
capital market to raise additional capital. Closed-end funds are not unknown to financial 
researchers. Numerous studies have examined many of the unique characteristics of 
closed-end funds that distinguish them from regular, operating companies. Yet there is no 
literature on post-IPO securities issuance by closed-end funds. This void is all the more 
interesting when viewed in the light of the following facts: 1) closed-end funds are much 
more likely to do seasoned equity issues than are regular operating firms, 2) when funds 
do seasoned equity issues, they are much more likely than are regular firms to do so in the 
form of a rights offering, a type of equity issuance that is now quite rare in the US for 
operating firms, and 3) when doing rights offerings, these funds generally do so using 
nontransferable rights, a type of rights offering that is virtually absent outside the closed- 
end universe. Evidence regarding these items is presented in this study. By way of 
motivating the subject, consider the first item above - the frequency of seasoned equity 
issuance by closed-end funds. Although the universe of equity oriented closed-end funds 
in the US is small, this group has made a relatively high number of seasoned equity 
offerings in recent years. From the group of 63 US equity closed-end funds existing in 
December 1990 and still trading eight years later (December 1998), there have been 64 
seasoned equity offerings during that eight year period, by 41 funds. There have been an 
additional 22 seasoned offerings by new funds that went public only after 1990. The
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
prevalence of equity offerings by these funds contrasts with the incidence among regular 
US operating firms. For a randomly selected sample of listed firms, Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) found that two-thirds of firms did no public offerings of any kind during their 11 
year study period. By comparison, only about one-fourth of equity closed-end funds have 
failed to do some type of seasoned offering in the 11 year period ending in December 
1998.
The value of a fund's investment portfolio, namely, its net asset value (NAV), is 
published every week. As a book value figure, the NAV is much more accurate and 
meaningful than the book value of a regular operating firm. For funds, but not for 
industrial firms, book value is the value of all assets, marked to current market prices. 
There is very little mystery about the current value of a fund’s assets. Thus, closed-end 
funds can be characterized by their relative lack of information asymmetry between 
insiders (the managers) and outsiders (the fund’s investors and potential investors). Also, 
the fact that funds are diversified means that the impact of any particular piece of private 
information that might exist is necessarily diminished in importance.
The absence of information asymmetry leads to the possibility of using closed-end 
funds as a known quantity or control group in order to study a disparate range of topics 
that have been of interest in finance. Some of the many contexts in which closed-end 
funds have been examined include:
2
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•  Whether two well established models of estimating the adverse selection component 
of the bid-ask spread (those of Glosten and Harris (1988) and George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran (1991)) are misspecified. This question was taken up by Neal and 
Wheatley (1995).
•  Arguments for and against the investor sentiment model of Delong, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990). This question is taken up by, among others, Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993).
•  Whether international stock markets and risk factors are segmented, or integrated. This 
has been examined by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994).
As the above list illustrates, closed-end funds have been examined from many 
angles. But, to date, there has been no research on seasoned equity issuance by these 
funds. This comes despite the fact that seasoned securities issuance is a well studied 
phenomenon, and, separately, most aspects of closed-end funds have been by this time 
been studied.
The remainder of this chapter describes the structure of closed-end funds, and 
briefly recapitulates some notable findings concerning the trading patterns of these funds. 
Some important legal and regulatory considerations governing closed-end funds are 
described, which again serve to distinguish funds from operating firms. The final section 
outlines the organization of this dissertation.
1.2 Structure and Trading Patterns of Closed-End Funds
Closed-end funds are publicly traded investment companies whose shares trade on 
a stock exchange (principally the NYSE). The value of the fund's holdings- its net asset
3
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value- is calculated and published weekly. Exchange of the fund's shares takes place not 
at the NAV (as is true of open-end mutual funds), but at the current market share price. 
Closed-end fund shares can, and generally do, sell at substantial discounts or premiums to 
NAV. Numerous studies, including Malkiel (1977), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and 
Pontiff (1995), have examined the discount/premia trading patterns of funds. There is as 
yet no integrative understanding of these trading patterns. This dissertation does not 
attempt to explain discounts and premia. It does, however employ discount/premia data to 
aid in the empirical analysis of securities issuance by closed-end funds.
At any point in time, the cross-section of fund discounts is likely to be quite wide. 
For example, for a typical week (fund discount/premia information is disseminated on a 
weekly basis by some major publications, including the Wall Street Journal and the New 
York Times), the week ending March 24, 1995, discounts on equity closed-end funds 
ranged from a 34% discount to a 32% premium. Fund discounts also display quite 
pronounced time-series movement. Fredman and Scott (1991) report on the 
discount/premium ranges of a  sample of 31 funds (those listed on the NYSE but targeting 
their investments in foreign countries), and find that the average fund in this sample had a 
52-week range of discounts/premia of greater than 40 percentage points. There is also 
quite a bit of evidence that these time-series fluctuations are correlated across funds 
(Bodhurtha, Kim and Lee (1995), Thompson (1978), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991a)).
The initial public offerings o f closed-end funds have also been studied. Funds 
always go public at a premium, a spread between NAV and offering price being necessary 
to cover underwriting and distribution expenses (paying $15 for $14 worth of assets is
4
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puzzling because there is nothing special about the fund's holdings- the assets immediately 
after the time of the offering consist entirely of cash, and there are no patents, trademarks, 
or innovative business operations involved). Almost invariably, the initial premium on the 
fund begins to erode and within a few months turns into a discount (Weiss (1989), Peavy 
(1990).
Finally, closed-end funds display significandy more volatility than their 
underlying portfolios do. Sharpe and Sosin (1975) find that share price variance is 36% 
greater than NAV variance. Pontiff (1993) finds share price variance to be 65% greater. 
The differences in volatility are puzzling, since the fund shares and the underlying 
portfolios hold identical claims to the same stream of dividends.
1.3 Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Closed-End Funds
Closed-end funds, as investment companies, are subject to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. One of the aims of that Act was to curb abusive practices by 
management, including dilution of investment company shares. Accordingly, Section 
23(b) prohibits the issuance of shares by investment companies at prices below net asset 
value. An exception is made if an offer is made directly to existing shareholders, i.e., as a 
rights offer. This rule, together with the fact that most closed-end funds have historically 
traded below net asset value (meaning that any new shares issued at market prices would 
be dilutive of NAV) most of the time, has resulted in rights offers being the predominant 
method of issuing equity for funds.
In 1977, the SEC issued an interpretive position, Release No. IC-9932. This 
position disallowed transferable rights offers by funds, unless management could make a
5
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case that a "very substantial majority" of the offer would be taken up by existing 
shareholders. Additionally, nontransferable rights offers would be permissible, but only if 
the size of the issue and the discount on the subscription price were such that no 
substantial dilution would be suffered by nonparticipating shareholders. The effect of 
these provisions appears to have been to preclude virtually any possibility of rights offers 
by closed-end funds. In response to industry arguments (Phillips, 1984), the SEC changed 
its position in 1985. The "substantial majority" requirement on takeup was removed and 
transferable rights were henceforth allowed as long as: 1) an offer does not discriminate 
among shareholders, 2) an adequate trading market exists for the transferable rights, and 3) 
the allocation ratio (which is inversely proportional to the size of the issue) is at least 3:1 
(thereby capping the size of the issue at one new share for every three old shares) (SEC 
Response, 1985).
The first closed-end fund rights offer subsequent to the SEC's regulatory 
adjustment occurred in 1989. From 1989 through 1998 there have been 88 rights offers by 
equity closed-end funds. During the same time period, there were 12 firm commitment 
offerings by seasoned funds. This highlights the fact that, through a combination of 
regulatory constraints and managerial choice, rights offerings are the predominant method 
of issuance for closed-end funds.
There are institutional reasons why closed-end funds are more likely than regular 
firms to issue seasoned equity. Regular operating firms primarily use retained earnings 
to achieve their expansion and investment goals. Funds, however, are bound by tax law 
to distribute to shareholders substantially all realized capital gains. Thus, funds with
6
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high or even moderate portfolio turnover find it difficult to retain their "earnings". 
Funds can mitigate this problem by enrolling some of their shareholders in automatic 
dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). However, it remains the case for most funds that 
in order for their asset base not to shrink over time, they must tap the public securities 
market for new capital.
1.4 Summary
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter 2 
reviews the existing body of literature on public securities issuance by seasoned firms. Of 
particular relevance to this study are the implications of the choice between using a firm 
commitment (underwritten) offering or a rights offering, and how that choice might affect 
firm valuation not only at the time of announcement but also at the time of the actual 
offering. Also, ownership structure and ownership concentration are thought to both inputs 
that go into the rights versus firm commitment choice, as well as outputs that are changed 
as a consequence of the choice.
In Chapter 3 this study draws out the implications, including the formulation of 
testable hypotheses, of securities issuance by closed-end funds. The process of developing 
this study’s sample is described in Chapter 4, along with some pertinent descriptive 
statistics about the sample. In Chapter S the main empirical analysis and results are 
reported. Conclusions about the findings of this dissertation are presented in Chapter 6.
7
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CHAPTER 2. PUBLIC SECURITIES ISSUANCE
2.1 General
A wealth of literature on securities issuance by regular operating firms (including 
Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) 
has established that the market reacts negatively to company announcements of seasoned 
equity offerings. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a theoretical framework for this 
phenomenon in terms of an adverse selection problem. Managers possess private 
information about their firms' prospects, and form their own assessments of firm value, 
using this private information. If the firm's shares are currently undervalued by the market 
(which uses only public information to set the share price), the managers will avoid 
issuing new shares. But if the market overvalues the firm, managers have an incentive to 
issue new shares. Therefore, the market interprets a decision to issue seasoned equity as a 
sign that the shares are overvalued, and lowers its appraisal of the firm accordingly. It is 
important to note that this framework assumes that outsiders, not current shareholders, are 
the purchasers of seasoned equity issues. Together with the assumption that managers act 
in the interests of existing (not necessarily prospective) shareholders, this is sufficient to 
induce managers to issue overvalued shares but refrain from issuing undervalued shares.
An alternative interpretation of securities issuance is given by Miller and Rock
(198S). Li that model, a firm's investment opportunities are assumed to be known by all 
parties. But only management knows current earnings, i.e., the results from past 
investment projects. If these earnings turn out to be higher than the market had anticipated, 
cash flow will be 'positive' relative to expectations, and this positive cash flow will accrue
8
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to investors as higher than anticipated dividends. If cash flow is sufficiently negative 
relative to expectations, the firm may require cash inflows in the form of unexpected 
securities issuance. The size of such an issuance is important, but the form (debt, rights 
offering, firm commitment equity offering) is not.
The Myers and Majluf model and the Miller and Rock model have in common that 
underwriters are not assumed to be informed. Hence, underwriters play no certification 
role, and do not help to bridge the information gap between management and investors. 
This is in contrast to those studies, including Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), and Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), in which underwriters do play a 
certification role. The role of underwriters is of interest in the case of securities issuance 
by closed-end funds. It can be conjectured that the operation and performance of these 
funds may be 'transparent' enough that no certification is required (because the funds are 
simply investment portfolios, and the holdings in these portfolios are publicly disclosed at 
regular intervals). Indeed, it turns out that the vast majority of seasoned offerings by 
closed-end funds are in fact not underwritten.
Empirical evidence is also available that seasoned equity issues are on average 
preceded by a period of strong positive abnormal returns for the issuing firms (a 'runup'). 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find an average excess return (over the T-bill rate) of +40.4% 
for days -480 to -10 before an announcement. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) 
find an excess return of +43.8% for days -500 to -1.
Lucas and McDonald (1990) provide an explanation for this runup, hi their model, 
overvalued, fairly valued, and undervalued firms all receive randomly timed positive net
9
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present value project opportunities. Delaying these projects by delaying raising the 
necessary capital is costly to firms due to the possibility of lost opportunities. Overvalued 
and fairly valued firms will therefore issue immediately upon project arrival (and 
overvalued firms may even issue in the absence of a project, if issue costs are low 
enough). Undervalued firms have an incentive to wait for their stock prices to reach more 
reasonable levels. Thus, undervalued firms will experience a price runup before issuance, 
while all other firms will have a flat price trend, on average. Therefore, the overall average 
will show a positive runup. As in Myers and Majluf, the new equity shares are assumed to 
be sold to outsiders.
Certain types of firms can be a priori characterized as having a relative absence of 
information asymmetry. Utility firms, which are relatively homogeneous and highly 
regulated, fit this description. For these type firms, adverse selection models would predict 
an attenuated market reaction to equity issue announcements. Empirical studies show that 
announcement returns for utilities are considerably less negative (though still significant) 
than for industrial firms (Asquith and Mullins (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). 
Furthermore, for utility firms, since the adverse selection problem is minimal, there should 
be little or no pre-announcement price runup. Asquith and Mullins find this to be the case, 
in contrast to the strong runup they find for industrial firms.
It can be argued that closed-end funds, like utilities, can be characterized by a 
relative absence of information asymmetry. With little information asymmetry and 
minimal adverse selection, it can be anticipated that the equity issuance announcement
10
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effects and pre-announcement price behavior will be weaker (perhaps nonexistent) for 
closed-end funds than for industrial firms.
2.2 Price Pressure Phenomena
Numerous studies have examined securities issuance events for evidence of either 
temporary (transactions costs based) or permanent (Demand Curve) price pressure 
resulting from the newly issued shares. Li addition to these issuance events, other events 
examined in light of price pressure hypotheses include block trades (both secondary and 
unregistered issues) and additions and deletions to the S&P 500 Index. Hansen (1988) 
rinds a significant negative correlation between returns in the period before rights offer 
commencement and the period after expiration, for a sample of insured US rights 
offerings. Since in his sample share prices decline and then bounce back around the offer 
period, Hansen interprets this as evidence of temporary price pressure. Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) find negative offering period returns for rights offers, with no bounce back. This 
rinding can be viewed as supporting the permanent price pressure hypothesis. In their 
study of firm commitment offerings, Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) rind no relation 
between offer day returns and issue size and therefore reject the hypothesis of permanent 
price pressure. Asquith and Mullins (1986) rind no significant price declines on the 
issuance date for firm commitment offerings. This can be construed as evidence against 
the existence of temporary price pressure during the time a securities offering is being 
conducted. Hess and Frost (1982), in a study of underwritten utility offers, and Marsh 
(1979), in a study of UK rights offers, reject both temporary and permanent price pressure.
11
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Both these last mentioned studies conclude that the market is liquid and that the demand 
for shares is very elastic.
The announcement of changes to the S&P 500 Index is said to provide a setting to 
examine price pressures without the presence of possibly confounding information effects. 
Of course, unlike securities issuance studies, the supply of shares is not being changed. 
Instead, there is a possible shift in the demand curve for shares. But, as in the case of 
securities issuance, the evidence on price pressure from S&P Index studies is very mixed. 
Shleifer (1986) finds excess returns for new S&P additions of over 3%. Since these returns 
are said to be far too large to be accounted for by the transactions costs of the relevant 
marginal investors, the results are attributed to a Demand Curve effect. Harris and Gurell
(1986) also find excess returns over 3%, but these are fully reversed within two weeks. 
Thus, the results are attributed to temporary price pressure. Edmister, Graham, and Pirie 
(1994) find fault with the estimating procedure of earlier studies in this genre, and, with 
their technique, conclude that the market for shares is liquid and highly elastic, i.e., their 
evidence does not support either temporary or permanent price pressure hypotheses.
What is the likely nature and extent of price pressures around the time of equity 
issuance by closed-end funds? In the case of temporary, transactions costs-based pressure, 
the answer is likely to depend on who the marginal investor is in these events. If the 
marginal investor has low transactions costs, then temporary price pressure will be small. 
For instance, Shleifer (1986) argues that large institutions are the marginal investors at the 
time of S&P 500 Index changes, and that transactions costs for these institutions might be, 
at most, 1% (including commissions, spreads, and market impact costs). A nearly
12
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diametrically opposed view is presented by Hansen (1988), who attributes the very large (- 
6.41%) negative returns in the presubscription period of a sample of insured rights 
offerings to transactions costs, even though he also provides evidence that most of the 
issuing firms had very large capitalizations. (It would seem that the marginal investors in 
these large firms are large institutions with low transactions costs). Most closed-end funds 
have very small market capitalizations. The market capitalization factor by itself could 
limit the activity of large institutional investors in these funds. Additionally, there is 
abundant evidence (including Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and Weiss-Hanley, Lee, 
and Sequin (1993)) that closed-end fund shares are held and traded overwhelmingly by 
small investors. If small investors also predominate in the trading of shares around closed- 
end fund equity issuance, then these small investors may serve as the marginal investors 
during those events. As small investors, they will have relatively high transactions costs, 
which could be made manifest in the form of relatively large price pressures. In other 
words, closed-end fund seasoned equity issuance events may be prime candidates for 
displaying transactions costs based price pressure. If other research has found evidence of 
price pressure in the shares of large firms, then it is all the more likely to be evident in the 
shares of small, thinly traded closed-end funds, whose shares are owned and traded 
predominantly by small individual investors.
Turning to the case of permanent price pressure, the claim that permanent price 
pressure should not exist in reasonably efficient financial markets rests on the supposition 
that there are many arbitrarily close substitutes available for a firm’s shares. In one view, 
the close substitutes argument is especially appropriate for closed-end funds. Consider the
13
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alternatives to holding shares in a given closed-end fund: 1) hold shares in any of the 
several other closed-end funds in the same category (e.g., TJS General Equity Funds'), 2) 
buy an actively managed open-end mutual fund instead, 3) buy an index fund (probably 
reducing fees in the process), 4) build your own diversified portfolio of individual stocks. 
Even if the closed-end fund in question is a foreign country fund (such funds have a 
mandate to direct most of their investments to a single specific foreign country), there will 
likely be several alternatives: I) buy another closed-end fund having the same focus 
(often, more than one closed-end fund targets the same country or region), 2) buy an open- 
end mutual fund targeting the same country or region, 3) buy ADR's of the country. From 
this perspective, closed-end funds are highly substitutable, and should be one of the least 
likely asset category to exhibit permanent price pressure.
On the other hand, closed-end funds may have a very limited clientele. Consider 
some of the disadvantages of these funds: 1) there are very few funds with superior 
medium or long-term relative performance, 2) volatility is much greater for fund shares 
than for the NAV portfolio (Sharpe and Sosin (1975), Pontiff (1993), Hardouvelis, La 
Porta, and Wizman (1994)), and most likely greater than for any reasonable substitute 
asset, 3) closed-end funds will for the most part be inappropriate investment vehicles for 
institutional investors because they would be delegating their investment decision­
making responsibilities and incurring an extra layer of management fees. Pontiff (1993) 
provides empirical evidence to support the contention that closed-end funds are, for 
most purposes, redundant assets. From this perspective, if a closed-end fund issues new 
shares, it may find that there is no clientele for those shares. According to this view, and
14
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in opposition to the ease-of-substitution argument in the preceding paragraph, these 
funds may have the potential to exhibit pronounced Demand Curve effects in equity 
issuance events.
2.3 Rights Offers
Smith (1977) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992), among others, document the relative 
scarcity of rights offerings by industrial firms in the US and indicate that these offerings 
had virtually ceased after about 1976. The appeal of rights offers for industrial firms has 
waned in the US, despite evidence that rights offerings involve significantly lower direct 
float costs than firm commitments (Smith (1977); Eckbo and Masulis (1992); Hansen 
(1988)).
In the context of Miller and Rock, the decision between using rights offerings 
versus firm commitment offerings is of no particular significance. The choice of debt 
versus equity is also not important. Nor does it matter whether an offering is directed to 
existing shareholders, or to outsiders. All that matters is the fact of the inferred fact that 
there is a need for cash inflow into the firm, and the size of that inflow. All of these 
choices, however, are important in the adverse selection models of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Lucas and McDonald (1990). These models come into play to the extent that 
outsiders participate in the equity offering. That is, the adverse selection problem increases 
with the proportion of shares that are purchased by outsiders. In a rights offering, shares 
are offered to existing shareholders, via subscription rights. If these rights are transferable, 
outsiders can buy these rights and participate in the offering. For an offering in which all 
the rights are exercised by current shareholders, there is no possibility of a transfer of
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wealth between current shareholders and outside parties, therefore, there is no adverse 
selection problem (the stock may have been undervalued, but that just means the existing 
shareholders, by subscribing to the offer, were able to increase their dollar stake in the firm 
at a favorable price). For all other patterns of offer participation, the adverse selection 
problem of Myers and Majluf increases in tandem with the fraction of outside 
participation.
Using this logic, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) construct and then test a model where 
managers choose the optimal form of equity issuance, based on their private information 
about the firm. Suppose a firm's equity issue, whether it be a rights offering or a Arm 
commitment, can be bought up by two groups: current shareholders, and outsiders. If the 
firm knew that the entire issue would be bought up by current shareholders, then it would 
issue equity even if managers considered the firm undervalued, because there would be no 
transfer of wealth to outsiders, and current shareholders would suffer no dilution. On the 
other hand, if managers thought outsiders would buy a significant fraction of the issue, 
then they might issue when overvalued, but not when undervalued. Thus, issuance in the 
form of a rights offering is perceived by the market as having only minimal adverse 
selection implications, to the extent that the issue is expected to be taken up by current 
shareholders, hi actual practice, the 'takeup' can be signaled, even before the issue, by 
managers who obtain and make public the precommitments of large shareholders to 
subscribe to the rights offer. Firms that cannot obtain such precommitments (i.e., expected 
takeup is low) must do a “standby” rights offering, in which an underwriter commits to 
buy up and place all unsubscribed shares. The standby rights offer thus implies more of an
16
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adverse selection problem, and the market reaction is more negative than an uninsured 
offering. The strongest negative reaction is reserved for firm commitment offers, where 
the expected takeup is assumed to be near zero, i.e., the firm is overvalued. Thus Eckbo 
and Masulis assign places for uninsured and standby rights offers in the pecking order of 
security issuance that runs the spectrum from risk-free debt to bank debt to risky public 
debt to rights offers to firm commitments.
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) develop a model slightly different than Eckbo and 
Masulis. The lowest quality firms issue via firm commitment offerings (as in Eckbo and 
Masulis). But the highest quality firms choose insured (standby) rights offers (not 
uninsured rights offers). Standbys involve an 'insurance' fee for the contingent 
underwriting activity, but this insurance is fairly priced and observable, so it carries no 
adverse selection implications. Furthermore, standbys entail certification by an 
underwriter, a positive signal lacking in uninsured offerings.
Consider that even an uninsured rights offering will be fully subscribed if the 
subscription price is set sufficiently low. hi the pure theory of rights offers (ignoring 
adverse selection considerations), the subscription price is irrelevant- it cannot affect firm 
value. In the model of Heinkel and Schwartz, subscription price is irrelevant for insured 
offerings. The firm buys insurance in lieu of setting an arbitrarily low subscription price, 
but this insurance is fairly priced. For uninsured offerings, however, the market infers 
value from the level at which the subscription price is set - the lower the subscription 
price, the lower the market should set its appraisal of the company’s value. Management is
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said to set the price low enough so that any bad news that might be released before the 
offering will not cause the offer to fail.
Consistent with their predictions, Eckbo and Masulis find no significant 
announcement effect for uninsured rights offerings by industrial firms, a small but 
significantly negative -1.0 % for standbys, and the usual -3% for firm commitment equity 
offerings. This compares to the two-day announcement abnormal return of -2.61% found 
by Hansen (1988) for a sample of industrial standby rights offerings, and -1% found by 
White and Lusztig (1980) for a combined sample of standby and uninsured rights 
offerings by industrial and utility firms.
The finding by Eckbo and Masulis of no negative market reaction to uninsured 
rights offering is not supported by Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (1999). The latter authors find, 
for a sample of British rights offerings between 1986 and 1994, an average -2.90% 
negative excess return upon announcement of insured rights offerings but a -4.90% 
response to uninsured offerings. Uninsured offerings are associated with larger 
subscription price discounts. Controlling for the choice between insured and uninsured 
rights offerings, they find the discount (which is known at announcement time) to be 
negatively related to announcement period returns. That is, the larger the discount, the 
more negative the announcement returns.
hi the model of Eckbo and Masulis, an undervalued firm can avoid the adverse 
selection problem by choosing an uninsured rights offer (if only current shareholders 
subscribe to the offer, then only these shareholders benefit from the undervaluation), hi 
particular, the firm can avoid having to delay issuance until its share price has runup to
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more reasonable levels. Thus, there will be no runup, on average, for firms that choose 
uninsured rights offers. Consistent with their model, Eckbo and Masulis find no price 
runup for uninsured rights, a small runup (44.57%) for standbys, and a larger runup 
(4-12%) for firm commitments, for the three months before announcement. They also find 
significant negative abnormal returns of about -4% during the subscription offer period of 
uninsured offerings, which typically lasts about three weeks. Possible reasons for these 
negative returns are given as: 1) the compensation required by investors for rearranging 
their portfolios (this is the 'transactions costs' version of the price pressure hypothesis), and 
2) "the fact that the primary market, where there are no purchaser-bome fees, draws buyers 
away from the secondary market".
Marsh (1979) examines a sample of UK rights offers. He finds a very small (- 
0.9%) but significant price pressure effect on returns during the offer period. But a 
subsequent bounceback, along with the fact that the negative offer period returns are not 
related to issue size, suggests again a transactions cost based, temporary price pressure 
effect, hi contrast to the model of Eckbo and Masulis, he finds a very large (4-30%) price 
runup in the 12 months before the rights offers.
Several observations are in order with regard to the institutional setting of 
securities issuance by closed-end funds. First, the method of equity issuance (rights offer 
or firm commitment) probably does not have the same signal content as it would for 
industrial firms. During the time of the study period, the vast majority of funds would have 
been precluded by SEC regulations from conducting firm commitment offers, as fund 
share prices tended to trade below NAV. Also, the Eckbo and Masulis concept o f using
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precommitments as a signal of the offer’s takeup does not appear to apply to closed-end 
funds, hi general, as discussed below, these funds lack institutional holders and 
blockholders, whose role in the Eckbo and Masulis model is to make the necessary 
precommitments. Finally, though a thorough search was not conducted, it appears that 
closed-end funds do not issue public debt. The Investment Company Act caps the 
allowable leverage of closed-end funds at 25% of total capitalization. Perusal of fund 
annual reports indicates that funds in fact carry virtually no debt. Closed-end fund 
shareholders still carry debt to the extent that the companies in the fund's investment 
portfolio are leveraged. It can be conjectured that funds choose not to use further leverage 
in an effort to appeal to the broadest possible clientele.
There is no literature on nontransferable rights, for either closed-end funds or 
firms in general. The majority of rights offerings in this study involved nontransferable 
rights. Nontransferable rights also are used by regular operating firms in the US, but 
they apparently constitute less than a majority of rights offers (Moody's). SEC 
regulations would seem to dictate the use of nontransferable rights for at least some 
closed-end fund offerings. This is due to the requirement that transferable rights must 
have an adequate trading market. The value of a transferable right is determined by 
arbitrage between the rights price and the share price. The rights price is directly related 
to the size of the issue and to the discount on the offer subscription price. If the discount 
is small or the relative size of the issue is small, the value of the rights will be too small 
(i.e. the rights may be worth only a fraction of a dollar) to make an effective market in 
the rights, and management may feel compelled to use nontransferable rights instead.
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2.4 Ownership Structure and Concentration
The ownership structure of this study's sample is of interest in light of the findings 
of Hansen and Pinkerton (1982). For a sample of 54 US rights offerings (offerings by 
operating firms, not closed-end funds) from 1971 to 1979, they find that insiders or single 
blockholders own a 61% stake, on average, before issuance. For a Arm where most of the 
shares are held by a very few shareholders, the distribution costs of an equity offer should 
be low, and there is no reason to pay for the distribution capabilities of an underwriter. 
The authors contend that firms with diffuse ownership will find it cheaper to employ an 
underwriter than to distribute the shares internally (via a rights offer). Thus, in general, 
highly concentrated firms will choose rights offerings, while diffusely held firms will 
choose firm commitment offerings. Another aspect of high ownership concentration is that 
monitoring is presumably done effectively by the blockholders, reducing the need for 
external certification by underwriters. This diminishes one of the theoretical advantages of 
an underwritten offer, and makes a rights offering relatively more advantageous.
Hansen and Pinkerton analyze only the direct costs associated with a rights 
offering. Kothare (1997) maintains, and provides evidence for, the contention that the 
indirect costs of rights and firm commitment offerings are much larger and of a more 
lasting duration. In a before-and-after issuance analysis, she finds that rights offerings 
decrease the liquidity of a firm’s shares, post-event Since the rights offering is marketed 
by design to the firm’s existing shareholders, and, as it turns out, the takeup is skewed 
toward those who already have the largest stakes, the result is that ownership 
concentration is increased. With higher ownership concentration there is less trading
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liquidity. Kothare finds that percentage bid-ask spreads increase significantly after rights 
offers. Higher bid-ask spreads mean higher trading costs. Investors require compensation 
in the form of higher expected returns, which implies a lower value for the firm. Firm 
commitment offerings, on the other hand, have the effect (Kothare reports) of broadening 
the firm’s ownership. She finds that bid-ask spreads significantly decrease for firms that 
do firm commitment offerings. This would imply a higher value for the firm. Thus, while 
rights offerings may have lower direct costs, they also entail higher indirect costs, while 
firm commitment offerings entail indirect benefits. Kothare contends that the heavy 
predominance of firm commitment over rights offerings in the US is explainable in terms 
of these ownership concentration and trading cost phenomena.
In Eckbo and Masulis (1992), firm managers are said to be able to signal the 
eventual takeup of a rights offer by divulging the precommitments of outside 
blockholders. This scheme, of course is contingent upon there being sufficient 
blockholdings in the firm's ownership. Evidence in this regard in presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3. IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITES ISSUANCE BY
CLOSED-END FUNDS
3.1 Implications for Pre-announcement and Announcement Period Returns
Under a standard interpretation o f the Semi-Strong Form Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, managers of mutual funds hold no information about securities that is not also 
known by the market. This assertion is supported by the many studies (dating back to 
Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968)) showing that mutual fund managers as a group fail to 
outperform the market. This implies that neither closed-end fund managers nor open-end 
fund managers hold any nonpublic information. Some researchers have even taken it as 
axiomatic that there is no information asymmetry in closed-end funds (see Peavy, 1990). 
For instance, Simon and Wheatley (1995) test some established models of the adverse 
selection component in bid-ask spreads using closed-end fund spreads as a control group 
for which there should be no adverse selection component. Adverse selection is said to be 
minimal because both managers and the public can observe the value o f the fund's 
underlying portfolio. This value is the NAV, which is published weekly. Also, the fact that 
funds are diversified means that the impact o f any particular piece of private information 
is necessarily mitigated.
The managers o f closed-end funds have the ability to raise new equity in the public 
securities market. What inferences should the market draw when managers do this? From 
the perspective o f Myers and Majluf, since there is no asymmetric information between 
the market and fund managers, the markets should view the event as being neutral. This
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conclusion applies whether the issue involves a debt issue, a rights offering, or a firm 
commitment offering. Closed-end funds should exhibit no significant abnormal returns at 
the time of issue announcement. From a Miller and Rock perspective, the firm's important 
information releases are unexpected dividends and unexpected external financing. But for 
closed-end funds, dividends are largely dictated by investment portfolio performance and 
tax statutes. Investment performance is readily observable by shareholders, in the form of 
weekly published NAV figures. Thus it seems that an external financing event would 
impart very little relevant information to the market.
In the offering prospectuses of closed-end funds, there are several reasons given 
for why a seasoned equity offering may be beneficial for shareholders. By expanding the 
asset base, fund managers are said to be able to take advantage of attractive new 
investment opportunities, without having to sell off current holdings. A larger asset base 
achieves economies of scale, perhaps allowing lower expense ratios. And in the case of 
rights offerings, shareholders can enlarge their holdings at a 'discounted' price, without 
having to pay commission costs. It is also usually noted in the prospectus that an offering, 
by expanding the asset base, will have the effect of increasing the dollar amount of the 
compensation paid to the management firm.
How does the pre-announcement price path model of McDonald and Lucas (1990) 
apply to closed-end funds? In their model, if information asymmetry between a firm and 
the market is small, so too is the magnitude of possible undervaluation. Modest 
undervaluation or overvaluation would not be an important factor for managers choosing 
the frequency or timing of equity issues. On average for this small-asymmetry group, there
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should be no price runup before equity issues. We would, however, expect closed-end 
equity issues to cluster around periods of large returns for the US market (i.e., large 
absolute returns). For stocks in general (and, by extension, for the special category 
consisting of closed-end funds), both the model of Lucas and McDonald and the empirical 
findings of Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) find that seasoned equity issues are 
on average accompanied by large runups in the US market, hi summary, closed-end fund 
equity issues should be associated with runups in the US market, but not with runups by 
the funds relative to the US market. As for post-issue performance, this is an open 
question. In general, the securities issuance literature indicates that issuing firms issue new 
shares after market runups, but quite often the market continues to run up after issuance. In 
this sense, firm managers cannot be said to have 'timing' ability.
hi contrast to the Lucas and McDonald model, the investor sentiment hypothesis 
can be viewed as leading to somewhat different implications concerning closed-end fund 
equity issues and pre-announcement price runups. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) draw 
as an implication of the investor sentiment model that IPO's for new closed-end funds will 
coincide with an average narrowing of discounts in the closed-end industry. The 
narrowing of discounts is said to reflect positive sentiment on the part of sentiment 
investors and this leads to excess returns for closed-end funds relative to the US market. 
Positive sentiment also makes the market receptive to IPO's of new funds, and 
entrepreneurs exploit these opportunities. Lee et al. find that the closed-end industry’s 
value-weighted average discount narrows by 7 percentage points for years in which new 
funds go public, compared to years in which no funds go public (during their study period,
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the closed-end fund universe was much smaller, so that it was not unusual for there to be 
no new funds launched in a given year).
It may be that investor sentiment influences closed-end fund seasoned equity 
issues (a phenomenon which has never been studied) as well as the IPO's by these funds 
(which have been studied). The same positive sentiment that allows new funds to be 
floated may also allow managers of existing funds to float additional shares. Of the 71 
seasoned equity issues in this study (60 rights offerings and 11 firm commitments), 57 
occurred during the 1992-94 period. This same period saw an approximately 50% increase 
in the number of equity closed-end funds, with 45 new funds going public. Arguably, 
favorable valuations, possibly driven by investor sentiment, influenced both phenomena. 
Evidence would come in the form of significant positive movements in the 
discounts/premia, on a fund by fund basis, during the time leading up to issue 
announcement, for those funds that did seasoned equity issues. That is, if a fund 
announces a seasoned issue, we should be able to look back and see a positive movement 
in its discount/premium series leading up to the announcement. And, because total returns 
on fund shares are determined in part by discount movements, in the pre-announcement 
period we should also observe abnormal returns (price runups) for the sample of issuing 
funds, relative to the US market. Again, this investor sentiment prediction is in contrast to 
the predictions about closed-end funds that would follow from the adverse selection 
literature.
The investor sentiment model has no strong implications for the returns to be 
expected upon announcement of a closed-end fund equity issue. Sentiment may have
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carried a fund’s price higher before an issue, but there is nothing in the model to say that 
sentiment would reverse (causing negative announcement returns) immediately upon 
notice of an impending issue. The investor sentiment model does not lead to any 
hypothesis about the announcement effects of closed-end fund equity issues.
In contrast, adverse selection models do lend themselves to a prediction about 
announcement effects of closed-end equity issues. The adverse selection model makes an 
exception for its own rule that securities issuance is always bad news. The exception is 
that if there is very little information asymmetry, there will be very little market reaction. 
As discussed above, if the market is efficient, closed-end funds should be associated with 
a virtual absence of information asymmetry. Therefore, a finding of no significant 
announcement effects for closed-end fund issuance would tend to confirm the adverse 
selection model.
The testable hypotheses developed thus far are as follows:
Hypothesis #1
Ho: In the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds 
show no significant price runup, relative to the US market.
Ha: hi the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds 
show a significantly positive price runup, relative to the US market.
Hypothesis #2
Ho: In the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds 
show no significant movement in their discount/premium.
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H,: In the year prior to announcement o f a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds 
show a significantly positive movement in their discount/premium.
Hypothesis #3
H0: There is no significant market reaction to the announcement of seasoned 
equity issues by closed-end funds.
H,: There is a significantly negative market reaction to the announcement o f 
seasoned equity issues by closed-end funds.
3.2 Implications for Offering Period Returns
Marsh (1979), Hansen (1988), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) all find evidence of 
a price pressure effect around the offering period of rights offers (again, using samples of 
regular operating firms). These studies find negative returns during the offering period, or 
in the period after announcement and running through the offer period, and positive 
returns in a period after expiration of the offer. An exception is Eckbo and Masulis, who 
find the negative offering period returns but no bounceback after the offer.
In the price pressure literature (including Scholes (1972), Kraus and Stoll (1972), 
Dann, Mayers, and Raab (1977), and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)), two types o f price 
pressure are discussed most frequently. Temporary price pressure is said to occur because 
the buyers o f blocks of shares require a price concession to compensate for the transaction 
costs o f  rearranging their portfolios. Prices return to normal once the block has been 
placed. CBlocks' here include the placement o f a large number o f shares via a rights 
offering or a primary or secondary firm commitment offering, in which, generally, the 
block is split between many buyers.) The second type o f price pressure is o f a more
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permanent nature. It is associated with the hypothesis from Scholes of a downward- 
sloping demand curve for a firm's shares. To the extent that there is no perfect substitute 
for a firm's shares, incrementally placed shares are priced according to a downward- 
sloping demand curve (in contrast to the ideal in finance of a perfectly elastic demand 
curve). Thus, a seasoned equity issue causes a permanent downward adjustment in a firm's 
share price.
Consider how price pressure may relate to rights offerings. If temporary price 
pressure is present, there will be negative abnormal returns during the offering period, and 
a recovery after the offer expires. If permanent price pressure is present, the price recovery 
will be absent, or will be smaller in magnitude than the negative offering period returns 
(i.e., if there is both a temporary and a permanent effect, the recovery will be only partial). 
But, according to Eckbo and Masulis, it is difficult to distinguish between permanent and 
temporary effects in rights offerings using tests for price reversal. Such tests lack power: 
the events lack a common event-window size, since offer period durations vary from 
rights offer to rights offer.
Notwithstanding Eckbo and Masulis, there may be another way to distinguish 
between permanent and temporary price pressure effects in rights offerings. The sample in 
this study has both transferable and nontransferable rights offerings. In a nontransferable 
offer, to the extent that the offered shares are placed, they must be taken up by existing 
shareholders. Shareholders must subscribe or suffer dilution. The amount of dilution (in 
percentage terms) a shareholder can suffer is a function of both the size of the issue and 
the percentage discount on the offer's subscription price. In contrast, in a transferable offer,
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a shareholder who does not wish to subscribe for additional shares can sell his rights on 
the market. There are transactions costs involved in selling rights, but those costs are likely 
to be much lower than the costs facing the shareholder in a nontransferable offer. For the 
shareholder who lacks a transferable right, transactions costs could include selling off 
unwanted shares, or selling other holdings to raise money for the subscription. (To give a 
numerical example that is typical of rights offerings, the shareholder who does not wish to 
participate in a transferable rights offering can seal his N rights at, say, $0.75 per right. 
But the unwilling shareholder in a nontransferable offering must sell N shares at, say, $15 
per share). All of these costs could lead to temporary price pressure, and the higher the 
transactions costs, the greater the temporary price pressure. All of this is consistent with 
the evidence that Hansen (1988) supplies: (transferable) rights offers impose higher 
transactions costs on nonparticipating shareholders than firm commitment offerings do. If 
that is true, then it is a simple extension to say that nontransferable offerings impose even 
greater costs on nonparticipating shareholders.
On the other hand, if an equity issue is to have a permanent, demand-curve effect 
on share price, it should not matter what the mechanics of the rights are or how the takeup 
occurs (the takeup could be by existing shareholders, new investors, or a combination). 
That is, whether the rights are transferable or nontransferable should not affect the price. 
And transactions costs are not important in permanent price pressure. Only the size of the 
issue matters. Since the issuing firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the greater 
the number of new shares that are issued, the lower the market clearing price will be for 
those shares.
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
If the price pressure is temporary and driven by transactions costs, then 
nontransferable offerings should have a larger price impact than transferable offerings, 
since the former involve higher transactions costs. Furthermore, the amount of price 
pressure in a transferable offering will be relatively insensitive to the size of the issue. This 
is because nonparticipating shareholders can just as easily (and at about the same dollar 
cost) sell their rights in a large-sized offering as they can in a small offering. Contrast this 
to the strategy of a shareholder in a nontransferable offering who simply wishes to 
maintain his pre-existing holdings. The shareholder could sell shares before the ex-rights 
day (thereby losing the right to subscribe to the issue), then buy them back on the open 
market during the offer period. This would involve two market transactions, with 
commissions and bid-ask spreads. A possibly less costly strategy would be to hold the 
shares until after the ex-rights day (thereby retaining the right to subscribe to the offer), 
then sell N shares on the open market during the offering period while also subscribing to 
buy N shares (the shareholder’s full allotment under the offer), so as to finish with the 
same holdings as before the event. The transactions costs here would be proportional to the 
size of the offering (the offer size determines how many shares need to be sold off to 
maintain the investor’s pre-offer position). The third option would be to do nothing, and 
absorb the dilution. But the amount of potential dilution, and therefore the transactions 
costs one is willing to absorb in order to avoid the dilution, is proportional to both the offer 
size and the offer discount. Using the mean subscription price discount of 10.9% (see 
Table 3, discussed in Chapter 4) and the mean offer size (see Table 4) for nontransferable
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rights offerings, a typical dilution from nonparticipation can be calculated as slightly more 
than 2%.
hi summary, if the price pressure in rights offerings is of the permanent, demand- 
curve variety, then there should be negative returns during the offer period, with no 
reversal in the post-expiration period. Also, there should be no difference in offer period 
returns between transferable and nontransferable offers, controlling for issue size. By 
contrast, if the price pressure if of the temporary, transactions-cost variety, there would be 
a price rebound after expiration. Also, nontransferable issues should have stronger 
negative returns during the offer period, controlling for issue size. Finally, the offering 
period returns of nontransferable issues, but not necessarily those of transferable issues, 
will be negatively related to the product of relative issue size and relative subscription 
discount. The competing hypotheses are as follows, with the null hypotheses being 
associated with permanent price pressure and the alternative hypotheses favoring 
temporary price pressure:
Hypothesis #4:
Ho: There are no significantly positive returns in the period immediately following 
the expiration of closed-end fund rights offerings.
Ha: There are significantly positive returns in the period immediately following the 
expiration of closed-end fund rights offerings.
Hypothesis #5:
Ho: There is no difference between transferable and nontransferable rights 
offerings in the average returns during the offer period, controlling for issue size.
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H,: Average returns during the offer period are significantly more negative for 
nontransferable than for transferable issues, controlling for issue size.
Hypothesis #6:
H„: There is no relation between the offer period returns for nontransferable rights 
and the 'dilution potential', defined as the product o f relative issue size and relative 
subscription discount.
H,: There is a significantly negative relation between the offer period returns for 
nontransferable rights and the 'dilution potential', defined as the product of 
relative issue size and relative subscription discount 
3.3 Implications for Ownership Concentration
Kothare (1997) provides evidence that rights offerings increase ownership 
concentration and decrease trading liquidity, especially when contrasted with firm 
commitment offerings, which have the opposite effects on ownership concentration and 
trading liquidity. Are these findings applicable to equity offerings by closed-end funds?
This dissertation reports on, in Chapter 5, changes in trading volume for funds that
did rights offerings, where trading volume is measured at a point in time 12 months 
before, then 12 months after, the issuance event (so as not to conflate the before and after 
trading characteristics with trading in the actual event period). Similar volume data was 
collected and tested for each of the funds that did firm commitment offerings. Significant 
decreases in trading volume for rights offering funds and increases for the firm 
commitment funds would be supportive o f Kothare’s argument about the differential 
effect o f the two types o f offerings on ownership concentration.
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A more direct measure of changes in ownership concentration is also conducted: 
changes in the total percentage of share held by institutions in each closed-end fund, 12 
months pre- and post-issuance. Kothare uses blockholdings and insider ownership instead 
of institutional holdings, but, as described in Chapter 4, closed-end funds have negligible 
quantities of those two variables.
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CHAPTER 4. SAMPLE DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS
4.1 Sample Development
This study uses a sample of 97 seasoned equity issues, which comprises all but 
three of the issues that were done by all equity closed-end funds from 1986 through 1998. 
Three rights offerings were excluded because they entailed an initial announcement, 
followed by long periods approaching a year before the actual offerings got underway. 
Such long periods could not be reconciled with the estimation period used in the main 
event study. O f these 97 equity issues in the final sample, 85 were in the form of rights 
offerings, while 12 were firm commitment offerings.
Closed-end fund rights offerings were identified by examining the Subscription 
Rights section of the Moody's Dividend Record, for all years from 1986 to 1995. For 
offerings after 1995, a search of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR 
database was conducted. Firm commitment offerings were identified in the Standard & 
Poors Corporation Records and the Dow Jones News Retrieval service.
Offerings by nonequity closed-end funds, including bond funds, 'dual' funds (dual 
funds have two classes of shares: capital and income), and convertible funds were 
excluded from the sample.
Most o f the terms of the rights offers (such as allocation ratios, subscription prices, 
record dates, and expiration dates) were available from both Moody's and Dow Jones 
News Retrieval. Announcement dates and times were located on the DJ News Retrieval. 
Wire announcements were found for all 60 of the rights offers through 1994. For the rights
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offers from 1995 through 1998, the announcement dates were taken from the funds’ 
registrations filings (the filings always included language such as “the fund announced the 
offering after the close o f trading on October 2,1995”). No announcement could be found 
for two of the 14 firm commitment offers, leaving a sample o f 12 such offers. For rights 
offers, in general, the initial wire announcement contains the offer's allocation ratio (the 
inverse of the issue size), but no exact subscription price or record date. All events in the 
rights sample were identified in the initial announcement as to whether transferable or 
nontransferable rights would be used to conduct the offering.
Daily returns were obtained from CRSP. Weekly data on closed-end fund 
discounts and premia was obtained from the Wall Street Journal (via the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval), and, for some o f the foreign-invested funds, from David Muller, editor of the 
Foreign Markets Advisory.
Data on institutional share holdings and on fund trading volumes was collected 
from both the Moody’s Handbook of Common Stock and the Standard & Poors Stock 
Guide.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A o f Table 1 shows the distribution o f rights offers by year. Panel B o f 
Table 1 is a complete list o f the firm commitment offers. Table 2 shows the mean and 
median closing share prices and market capitalizations, as o f event day announcement, for 
the sample o f rights offers, and, separately, for the sample of firm commitment offers. 
Table 2 suggests that the firms in the sample can be characterized as “small cap”, by most 
reasonable definitions. Table 3 shows some summary statistics for the subscription price
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Table 1 - Time Distribution of Equity Offerings
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Table 2 - Market Capitalization Characteristics of Sample Firms on Announcement 
Day
Panel A: Rights offering sample
Mean share price 17.49
Median share price 13.63
Mean market capitalization ($ millions) 302.50
Median market capitalization ($ millions) 165.49
Panel B: Firm commitment offering sample
Mean share price 24.39
Median share price 22.88
Mean market capitalization ($ millions) 209.33
Median market capitalization ($ millions) 115.85
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Table 3-Rights issues: subscription price relative discounts








Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 54
tS ta t 2.557
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.007
t Critical one-tail 1.674
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.013
t Critical two-tail 2.005
Table 4-Relative size of rights issues








Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 69
tS ta t 2.310
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.012
t Critical one-tail 1.667
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.024
t Critical two-tail 1.995
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discount on transferable and nontransferable rights offers (the mean value of 0.1746 for 
transferable offerings means that those offerings had a subscription price that discounted 
by an average of 17.46% from the market price). Table 4 shows similar statistics for issue 
size. The subscription discount is significantly larger for transferable issues than for 
nontransferable issues. Issue size is also significantly larger for transferable issues. There 
are S1 nontransferable rights issues in the sample, and 34 transferable issues.
Of the 85 rights offerings, 78 were fully subscribed. The mean subscription rate 
was 96%.
Rights offerings can be insured or uninsured (insured offerings are often called 
'standby' offerings). In a standby offering, an underwriter contracts to step in, if necessary, 
to purchase and place all unsubscribed shares. After examining the wire announcements of 
all rights offers in the sample, and also a representative group of 19 offer prospectuses, it 
appears that there are no standby offers. All of the offers in the sample are uninsured. This 
stands to reason, in light of the prohibition against equity offers to the public at prices 
below NAV. If an offer would otherwise fail, and an underwriter steps in and places the 
shares in the open market, this would constitute a public sale of shares below NAV, 
running afoul of the Investment Company Act.
As discussed previously, the special regulatory setting of closed-end funds seems 
to account for the prevalence of rights offerings (as opposed to firm commitment 
offerings). Yet it may be that fund insiders also favor rights offerings because it allows 
them to increase their proportional holdings in the fund (by exercising their rights, buying 
additional rights, and exercising their oversubscription privileges), and therefore their
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control. But the evidence indicates otherwise. Of the 31 sample funds existing as of 
December, 1990, only four funds had insider (defined as officers, trustees, and directors) 
holdings of 1% or more, and only 2 had holdings of 2% or more (Herzfeld, 1992).
Blockholdings do not appear to be present in the closed-end fund sample. Of the 
31 funds in the rights offerings sample that were in existence as of December, 1990, only 
two out of 12 domestically-invested funds had 5% blockholders, and only five of 19 
foreign-invested funds had 5% blockholders (Herzfeld, 1992). This is consistent with the 
domestic closed-end fund sample of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and the foreign fund 
sample of Bekaert and Urias (1996). Both studies characterize fund share ownership as 
diffuse and dominated by small individual investors, with a dearth of institutional 
holdings.
In summary, it appears that funds conducting seasoned equity offerings, like the 
mutual fund industry in general, have only negligible insider holdings. Looking at both 
insider holdings and outside block holdings, it appears that, while other aspects of 
ownership characteristics may be important for closed-end funds, insider and 
blockholdings are not.
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Pre-issuance Price Runup
In the discussion in Chapter 3 on securities' issuance under adverse selection, it 
was hypothesized that closed-end fund seasoned equity issues on average are preceded by 
a period of robust US market returns. But relative to the US market, the issuing funds 
would display only a flat price trend. These predictions are conjectured as extensions of 
the empirical findings that utilities do not have pre-issue runups (Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)), and the common characteristic of utilities and closed- 
end funds: minimal information asymmetry. The investor sentiment model, on the other 
hand, can be viewed as saying that fund equity issues follow periods of superior fund 
performance. In particular, the pre-issuance period will be associated with a narrowing of 
discounts (or widening of premia).
Table 5 compares the total cumulative return of issuing funds and o f the value- 
weighted CRSP index during the year leading up to announcement o f a fund equity 
issuance. If fund j  announces a rights or firm commitment offering on, say, June 30,1993, 
then the cumulative return o f the fund in the year ending June 29,1993 is calculated, as is 
the return on the value-weighted CRSP index over the same period. Pairs o f  one year 
returns are collected like this for every closed-end fund equity issuance event
For the combined sample of rights and firm commitment offerings, the one year 
unadjusted return for issuing funds is +28.6%, compared to +17.0% for the value- 
weighted CRSP. For the subsample o f 85 rights offers, the means are +25.3% (funds) and
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Table 5-Unadjusted mean cumulative returns for the year preceding closed-end fund equity issue announcements.
(Mean returns and Difference-in-Means tests: two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance)
















Mean 0.2856 0.1696 Mean 0.2530 0.1730 Mean 0.5160 0.1455
Variance 0.1138 0.0098 Variance 0.1081 0.0093 Variance 0.1017 0.0133
Observations 97 97 Observations 85 85 Observations 12 12
Hypothesized 0 Hypothesized n Hypothesized 0
Mean Difference Mean Difference w Mean Difference
df 112 df 98 df 14
tS ta t 3.248 tS ta t 2.152 tS ta t 3.785
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.017 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001
t Critical one-tail 1.659 t Critical one-tail 1.661 t Critical one-tail 1.761
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.034 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002
t Critical two-tail 1.981 t  Critical two-tail 1.984 t Critical two-tail 2.145
+17.3% (CRSP). For the firm commitment subsample, the means are +51.69% (funds) 
and +14.6% (CRSP). Difference in means tests between issuing funds and market 
returns are highly significant for all three pairwise comparisons (full sample: 1% 
significance level, rights offering subsample: 5%, and firm commitment subsample: 
1%). It appears that the hypothesis of flat relative performance (relative to the US 
market) can be rejected. Note that the average contemporaneous one year US market 
returns (as proxied by the value-weighted CRSP) that precede fund equity issues, at 
17.0%, were fairly typical o f  annualized US stock market returns during the 1989-98 
period, but larger than the long term compounded US market return of about 10-11%. 
Depending on the perspective, fund equity issues appear to have followed either periods 
of "average" returns on the US market, or "large" returns on the market. It is possible 
that fund managers timed equity issues to occur after fund runups, not after market 
runups. Evidence touching on this question is presented in Table 6. In contrast to pre­
issue performance, results from the first 100 trading days after issue announcement 
provide little evidence that funds were able to do anything more than match the US 
market performance. Whether or not it was by design on the part o f fund managers, the 
timing o f equity issues appears to coincide with the cresting of fund performance 
relative to US market performance.
5.2 Event Study for Periods Around Issuance
For 85 closed-end fund rights offerings, estimates o f average abnormal stock 
returns were made for each of the following 7 periods of interest: a 60-day 
preannouncement period; a  2-day announcement period; a period after announcement but
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Table 6-Unadjusted mean cumulative returns for the first 100 trading days after closed-end fund equity issue announcments.
(Mean returns and Difference-in-Means tests: two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance)
















Mean 0.0009 0.0394 Mean -0.0060 0.0404 Mean 0.0498 0.0326
Variance 0.0502 0.0040 Variance 0.0305 0.0039 Variance 0.2021 0.0053
Observations 97 97 Observations 85 85 Observations 12 12
Hypothesized o Hypothesized o Hypothesized A
Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference U
df 111 df 105 df 12
tS ta t -1.633 tS ta t -2.311 tS ta t 0.131
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.053 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,011 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.449
t Critical one-tail 1.659 t Critical one-tail 1.659 t Critical one-tail 1.782
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.105 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.023 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.898
t Critical two-tail 1.982 t Critical two-tail 1.983 t Critical two-tail 2.179
before the offer begins; the starting day of the offering period; the offering period, less 
starting and expiration days; the expiration day of the offer; and a 5-day post-expiration 
period. The event study methodology is patterned after Eckbo and Masulis (1992). But 
while that study used an estimation period weighted toward post event returns, this 
dissertation employs an estimation period from 300 days before announcement to 100 
days after announcement.
Table 7 shows the abnormal returns estimates for the full sample of 85 rights 
offers (in Panel A), and for three subsamples: nontransferable rights offerings (Panel B), 
transferable rights offerings (Panel C), and a subsample that excludes those offerings for 
which there was a previous rights or firm commitment offering by the same closed-end 
fund (Panel D). The sample was split into transferable and nontransferable subsamples to 
examine possible effects of nontransferability, a feature of rights offerings that has never 
been examined before. In particular, there may be more adverse selection implications 
associated with nontransferable offerings, since these offers are more coercive of 
shareholders. On the other hand, nontransferability guarantees that, to the extent the offer 
is subscribed, it is subscribed by existing shareholders, possibly ameliorating transfer of 
wealth problems with outside parties. Also, as discussed above, it is assumed that 
nontransferable issues involve higher transactions costs for nonparticipating shareholders 
(who may be forced to subscribe and then to dump unwanted shares). This could lead to 
greater temporary price pressure. Finally, 'repeat' events were excluded (Panel D) to try to 
isolate those offerings having the most potential for imparting new information to the 
market.
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Table 7-Percent average abnorm al stock returns for 7 event periods around issue announcements.








Pre-offer period Offer start day
Offer period, 







Panel A: All rights offerings (N -  85)
% average abnormal return 1.41 -0.14 -1.19 -0.29 -4.18 0.33 0.97
z-value 0.67 -0.49 -1.46 -1.08 -5.78** 1.56 2.52*
% of sam ple negative 32.9 50.6 57.6 61.2 85.9 49.4 34.1
Average days in period 60 2 33.5 1 18.5 1 4.9
Panel B: Nontransferable rights offerings (N = 51)
% average abnormal return 0.94 0.40 -2.13 -0.21 -4.24 0.25 0.77
z-value 0.22 1.23 -1.93 -0.66 -4 .4 0 - 1.45 1.69
% of sam ple negative 51.0 39.2 66.7 58.8 86.3 56.9 33.3
Average days in period 60 2 35.1 1 20.1 1 4.9
Panel C: Transferable rights offerings (N = 34)
% average abnormal return 2.11 -0.95 0.23 -0.42 -4.09 0.45 1.26
z-value 0.79 -2.29* 0.15 -1.21 -3.74** 1.33 1.91
% of sam ple negative 41.2 67.6 44.1 64.7 85.3 38.2 35.3
Average days in period 60 2 31.1 1 16.2 1 4.9
Panel D: Rights offerings, less offerings having a  previous
rights or firm commitment offering by the sam e fund (N = 50)
% average abnormal return 2.56 0.09 0.34 -0.09 -4.27 0.40 1.60
z-value 0.99 0.11 0.14 -0.28 -4.37** 1.59 2.96
% of sam ple negative 50.0 44.0 44.0 54.0 84.0 44.0 26.0
Averaae davs in Deriod 60 2 35.1 1 18.0 1 4.9
The regression model is
7
rjt = C9 +  P u S i^  +  P a r&  Jmdjm +  E j, (1)
where rJh rust, and r# are, respectively, daily returns on closed-end fund j ,  the value- 
weighted CRSP index, and, for foreign-invested funds only, the dollar-denominated 
Morgan Stanley Capital International index for the corresponding country or region. Each 
of seven dummy variables, d^, is set to one during the appropriate time periods, as 
described above.
Table 8 shows the results from a separate sample of 12 firm commitment offerings 
by closed-end funds. Firm commitment offerings do not have offering periods stretching 
over several calendar weeks, as do rights offers. The only event period of interest is a two- 
day announcement period. The regression model used for the firm commitments therefore 
has only a  single dummy variable, that being for the announcement period.
Let t be the number o f days in event period n for fund j. Then fund f s  total 
abnormal return over event period n is given by This abnormal return is averaged 
across funds to get the average abnormal returns shown in the first row of each panel. Most 
event periods are of fixed length across funds, except for the pre-offer period and the offer 
period. The average length of each event period across funds is given in Table 7. All 
periods and days are trading days, not calendar days.
Estimation is by OLS. The test statistic for each dummy variable (i.e., for each 
event period) is
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Table 8-Percent average abnormal stock returns at announcement of 
firm commitment offerings
Regression model is Equation (1) in tex t 
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant at 





% average abnormal return 
z-value
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2 n  = ( f j n / t J i n )  (2)
with the quantity in the denominator o f the summed term being the OLS estimated 
standard error o f the estimate o f g/„.
5.3 Announcement Period Returns
Panel A of Table 7 indicates that there is no significant market reaction to 
announcement of closed-end fund rights offerings. Table 8 indicates the same result for 
closed-end firm commitment offerings, in contrast to the many studies of industrial firms 
that have found significant negative market responses to firm commitment offerings. The 
results here are not inconsistent with an adverse selection model o f securities issuance. If, 
as argued in Chapter 3, there is little information asymmetry attached to closed-end funds, 
then equity issuance will not cause the market to reappraise the fund's value.
In the full sample of rights offer events, there are several offers by funds that had 
previously (in the past two years, in most cases) issued equity via either a rights or a  firm 
commitment offering. The market may partially anticipate these 'repeat' events, thus muting 
the two-day announcement returns. The sample of rights offerings in Panel D of Table 7 
has been culled of all 'repeat' events. The results are essentially unchanged. Across all seven 
event periods, including the announcement period, the results are very similar between the 
full sample and the subsample of first-occurrence seasoned equity issues.
Panels B and C o f Table 7 break the rights sample into offerings having, 
respectively, nontransferable and transferable rights. The average abnormal
50
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respectively, nontransferable and transferable rights. The average abnormal 
announcement return is significantly negative (-0.95%, z-value o f >2.29) for transferable 
offers, but not for nontransferable offers (+0.40%, z=1.23). Also, 67.6% o f the 
transferable returns for the announcement period are negative, compared to only 39.2% 
in the nontransferable sample. These results are puzzling, as there is no obvious reason 
why only the transferable sample would have significantly negative abnormal returns. 
Intuition might suggest the nontransferable sample would have the more negative 
responses. Nontransferable rights leave the shareholder without an important option 
(the option to sell one's rights), and will for many investors entail higher transactions 
costs. It may be the nontransferable sample result that is most in need of an explanation. 
The average response from the transferable sample, -0.95%, is o f the same magnitude 
reported to what Eckbo and Masulis reported for a sample of uninsured rights offerings 
by industrial firms (their result, -1.39%, was marginally insignificant: z-value of -1.56). 
Nontransferable issues (Panel B) have never been studied before.
5.4 Offering Period Returns
The event study results in Table 7 indicate that offering period returns are 
significantly negative. Although the event periods corresponding to the first and last days of 
the offer period show no abnormal returns, the interim period has an average abnormal 
return of -4.18% for the full sample, and between -4 and -4 _% for the three subsamples 
(Panels B, C, and D). For the full sample, 85.9% of the events were negative. This is 
consistent with a price pressure effect In Chapter 3, it was argued that the market for 
transferable rights, when there is one, tends to decrease the pressure on the underlying
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provides no support for the contention that nontransferable offerings experience more price 
pressure than transferable ones. However, the hypothesis stipulated that the comparison 
must control for issue size. Larger issues entail more shares being placed, implying more 
portfolio rebalancing and higher transactions costs. Table 9 shows a difference in means 
test between the transferable and nontransferable samples, using raw, unadjusted returns 
from the entire offering period, including the start and expiration days. Table 9 does not 
reflect any controls for issue size. Neglecting issue size, there is no significant difference in 
offering period returns between transferable and nontransferable offers. Table 10 displays 
the results from the OLS regression
rjop — ct + PSIZE j + y  TRANS j  + £j (3)
that uses unadjusted offering period cumulative returns, rfJP, as the dependent variable, 
with a dummy variable, TRANSj, set to one if  rights offering./ has transferable rights. The 
other independent variable is the relative issue size, STZEj (calculated as the inverse o f the 
allocation ratio). The main effect being investigated in the regression is the difference 
between transferable and nontransferable rights. The coefficient on the dummy variable has 
the correct sign and a magnitude that would be economically feasible- offering period 
returns for transferable offerings are 1.55% greater than for nontransferable offerings.
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Table 9-Unadjusted cumulative returns during offering periods, for transferable 
nontransferable subsamples
Difference in Means t-test,












tS ta t 0.615
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.270
t Critical one-tail 1.674
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.541
t Critical two-tail 2.005
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Table 10-OLS estimates in a cross-sectional regression of raw offering period 
cumulative returns against relative issue size and a dummy for rights 
transferability
Sample: 34 transferable and 51 nontransferable rights offers.
Regression model : RjOP « a  + b’SIZEj + g*TRANSf + ej
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, a t the 1% level.
Independent variable Coefficient estimate t-statistic (p-value)
Relative issue size -0.0975 -1.90 (0.061)
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However, the coefficient is not significant. The model also fails the overall test of 
significance, at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the hypothesis that offering period 
returns are more negative for nontransferable offers, controlling for issue size, receives 
little support from this test.
If temporary price pressure (caused by transactions costs) occurs in rights 
offerings, it should be evident as abnormal negative returns during the offering period, 
followed by abnormal positive returns after the offer expires. This hypothesis is 
distinguished from permanent price pressure (associated with a downward-sloping 
demand curve for firm shares) because the latter form of price pressure implies an absence 
of price bounceback after the offer expires. If a null hypothesis of no positive abnormal 
returns in a post-expiration period can be rejected, such a result would favor temporary 
price pressure over permanent pressure. This is Hypothesis #4 of this study.
Post-expiration abnormal returns are shown in the last column of Table 7. For the 
full sample and for the no-repeated-events the subsample (Panel D) only, there are 
significant positive returns in the first five days after expiration. The magnitude of this 
price reversal, though, is less than the negative returns in the offer period (for example, 
offering period abnormal returns of negative 4.18% and post-offer abnormal returns of 
+0.97%, for the full sample). If the 5-day period captures all of the post-offer price 
rebound, then it would appear that there is both a temporary and a permanent component 
to the price pressure (since the price never fully recovers). To see whether a longer post­
offer period captures a larger price bounce, the entire model, Equation 1, was re-estimated 
using a 20-day post-expiration period, instead of 5 days. While the signs and significance
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of the other event period dummies remain unchanged (results not shown), the post­
expiration abnormal returns become insignificantly different than zero for the full sample 
and all three subsamples. In brief, there is little or no evidence of a  price recovery. Thus, 
based on the juxtaposition of offering period and post-offer returns, the hypothesis of 
permanent (Demand Curve) price pressure cannot be rejected.
As argued in Chapter 3, if there is temporary price pressure during an offering, 
then that pressure will be more severe for nontransferable offers. This is because 
nontransferable offers impose higher transactions costs on nonparticipating shareholders. 
Of course, transactions costs can be avoided by ignoring the rights offer and doing 
nothing, but the shareholder will then suffer dilution costs. Price pressure will be closely 
related to transactions costs, and potential dilution costs constitute an upper bound on how 
much transactions costs one is willing to absorb. For nontransferable offers, and to a lesser 
extent for transferable offers, price pressure will be proportional to dilution costs. Dilution 
costs, in turn, are proportional to issue size times subscription price discount. Downward 
price pressure is measured as negative returns during the offering period. The model is
r  jop — oc + SrZE j )(SUBDISC j ) + £] (4)
where rjop is the unadjusted cumulative offering period return on fund j, SIZEj is the 
relative size of the issue (given by the inverse of the offer’s allocation ratio), and 
SUBDISCj is the percentage discount on the subscription price. The regression is run 
separately for the transferable and nontransferable samples. The null hypothesis of no
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relation between offer period returns and dilution cost is expected to be rejected only for 
the nontransferable sample.
Results of the regressions are shown in Table 11. As expected, there is a 
significantly negative relation between offer period returns and dilution costs (t-value = - 
3.60). The coefficient on the dilution variable is difficult to interpret, as it represents the 
product of two other variables. But its magnitude appears to be reasonable in economic 
terms. For example, the dilution factor for an offering with a 4:1 allocation ratio and a 
10% subscription discount would be (.25)(. 10) = .025 (2.5%). If the discount were then 
increased from 10% to 20%, the offering period returns would decrease by an increment of 
h(.25)(.20 - .10) = -1.8%.
The tests for price pressure described thus far have involved the offer period and 
the immediate post-offer period. The focus on these two time periods in connection with 
price pressure is in accordance with some of the existing rights offerings literature (Marsh 
(1979), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). It may also be worthwhile to examine the entire 
period from just before the announcement date to after expiration. This longer time period 
will not capture temporary price pressure effects (a price decline and recovery), as those 
effects should occur entirely within a  subperiod of the longer period. However, it may 
more effectively capture any permanent price pressure phenomenon. At least some 
investors who are rebalancing their portfolios to adjust to the new supply of shares may 
make purchase, sale, or valuation decisions before the actual offer period. From a rational 
expectations perspective, investors' response to the new supply of shares may begin as 
early as the announcement of the issue (this view is presented by Hess and Frost (1982)).
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Table 11-OLS estimates in cross-sectional regressions of raw offer period 
cumulative returns against the product of relative issue size and relative 
subscription price discount. Separate regressions are done for the 
nontransferable rights subsample and the transferable rights subsample.
Regression m odel: RJOP = a  + b*(SI2Ej • SUBDISQ) + ej
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, a t the 
1% level.
Nontransferable rights offers (N=51) Coefficient estimate t-statistic (p-value)
Independent variable -0.7042 -3 .60" (< -01)





Transferable rights offers (N=34)
Independent variable Coefficient estimate t-statistic (p-value)
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Of course, there is the risk of conflating information effects from the announcement with 
Demand Curve effects. But, as argued, information effects for closed-end funds should be 
very modest, in theory. And this study's empirical results supported that theoretical 
argument: Table 7 showed an insignificant -.14% announcement period abnormal return 
for the full sample of rights offers.
Focusing on a larger time window that may yield insights into permanent price 
pressure effects, the average cumulative return on discount/premium is calculated for a 
period starting with the last published NAV before issue announcement and ending three 
weeks after the offer’s expiration (three weeks after the offer date, in the case of firm 
commitment offerings). Using discount/premium returns instead of share returns provides 
a measure of the change in demand for fund shares controlling for changes in NAV. It is 
the supply of fund shares that is being increased, not the supply of shares in the companies 
that are represented in the fund's investment portfolio. Closed-end funds are a class of 
assets for which the demand may be highly elastic, if it can be argued that there are many 
close substitutes for holding fund shares. Accordingly, there should be no price response 
(discount movement) associated with new issues of equity by these funds.
In this regard, discount/premium evidence is presented in Table 12. That table 
shows an average discount/premium movement of -4.39% (t-value of -3.95 for the null 
hypothesis of a zero movement). If this figure is interpreted as a price response to a change 
in share supply, it is large compared to most of the permanent price effects that have been 
reported in either the securities issuance literature or the S&P500-additions literature. It is, 
however, consistent with the offering period abnormal returns of -4.18% reported in Table
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Table 12-Univariate statistics: cumulative returns on discount/premium portfolios 
for 85 rights offerings and 12 firm commitment issuing funds, for the period 
starting with the last published NAV before issue announcement and ending with 






% negative returns 73.2
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7 (which, together with the weak post-offer returns also reported in Table 7, again 
suggests a permanent price pressure effect).
5.5 Changes in Ownership Concentration and Trading Volume
Kothare (1997) posits that rights offerings increase ownership concentration, thereby 
decreasing trading liquidity, while firm commitment offerings have the opposite effect. 
This study’s results along those lines are reported in Table 13. Both the rights sample and 
the firm commitment sample exhibit significant increases in trading volume 12 months 
after the issuance event compared to same-fund volume 12 months prior to issuance 
(significance is obtained using a paired observations t-test as well as a binomial z-test). 
However, the increase in trading volume for the firm commitment sample is significantly 
more than the increase for the rights sample. This could be interpreted as partial 
corroboration of Kothare’s results.
Table 14 reports changes in institutional share ownership for the rights and firm 
commitment samples. Neither sample shows a significant change in this type of 
ownership, which were at already at low levels, pre-event, for both samples. This result 
is not a reflection one way or another on the results of Kothare, who found increases 
(decreases) in ownership concentration for firms doing rights (firm commitment) 
offerings. The result in Table 14 is simply consistent with this study’s findings (reported 
in Chapter 4) that there are also scant insider and blockholder positions in closed-end 
funds.
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Table 13-Changes in trading volume of issuing firms' stocks before and after issuance: 
8S rights issues versus 12 firm commitment issues.
Log-change =  log(total monthly trading volume for the month falling 12 
months after issuance / total monthly trading volume for the month falling 12 months 
before issuance).







Percent firms with increases 63.53
Binomial z 2.49




Percent firms with increases 83.33
Binomial z 2.31
Difference-in-means test (test whether the mean log-changes in trading volumes between rights
and firm commitment issues are significantly different).
t-statistic -2.12
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Table 14-Changes in institutional share ownership of issuing firms' stocks before and 
after issuance: 85 rights issues versus 12 firm commitment issues.
Changes in the percentage of shares held by institutions (of the type required to file Form 
13's with the SEC), from 12 months before issuance to 12 months after issuance.






Change in ownership -0.44
t-statistic -0.41
p-value 0.68
Firm commitment offerings (N=12)
Pre-issue ownership 14.47
Post-issue ownership 13.61
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5.6 Evidence on Funds* Choice Between Rights and Firm Commitment Offerings
Recall that, because of the special regulatory constraints under which closed-end 
funds operate, these funds do not have a choice between rights and firm commitment 
offerings. In order to do a firm commitment offer, the fund’s shares must be trading at or 
above net asset value at the time o f the offering. How many funds qualify under this 
constraint? And of those who do qualify to do a firm commitment offering, how many 
choose to do so, in preference to a rights offering?
Table 15 shows the mean discount/premia at time of offer announcement for the 
rights issuing sample and separately for the firm commitment sample. As expected, 100% 
of the firms announcing for firm commitment offerings were trading at premia to NAV at 
the time. However, there were also 42 of 85 funds from the rights offering group that were 
trading at premia to NAV. Yet these 42 funds chose to do rights offerings. O f course some 
funds trading just slightly above NAV would not have considered themselves to be 
necessarily free to choose a firm commitment. This is due to the possibility that share 
price fluctuations could cause the small premium to turn to a small discount between the 
time of announcement and the time the actual offer could be carried out. This 
consideration might cause management to desire some cushion. Suppose this cushion is 
five percentage points of premium. Examination of the data show that with this threshold, 
26 of 85 funds (compared to 42 o f 85 when applying a 0% threshold) could have 
considered themselves eligible to choose between the two alternative floatation methods. 
This still means that in some 2/3 o f the cases where there was a viable choice (i.e., 26 
funds chose rights, versus 12 choosing underwritten offers), the funds chose the rights
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Table 15-Premiums and discounts to NAV immediately preceding 








premia/discounts a t 
issue 
announcement
Mean 0.0005 Mean 0.3725
Median •0.0022 Median 0.2267
Standard Error 0.01202 Standard Error 0.0895
Standard Deviation 0.11272 Standard Deviation 0.3101
Minimum -0.3024 Minimum 0.1272
Maximum 0.5553 Maximum 0.9816
Count 85 Count 12
% Positive 49.4% % Positive 100%
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offer method o f floatation. In addition to foregoing the possible indirect benefits o f firm 
commitment offers that are suggested by finance research (Kothare (1997), Slovin, 
Sushka, and Lai (1999), Singh (1997)), these funds also sacrificed the much faster time-to- 
market, and certainty o f proceeds that only underwritten offers provide.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
Although there is a small body of literature on the IPO process for closed-end 
funds, there has been no examination of seasoned equity issuance by these funds. Closed- 
end funds are a potentially interesting subject in corporate finance because of their 
pronounced differences with operating firms: 1) funds make no operating decisions, they 
only hold the securities of other companies, 2) the financing decisions of funds are heavily 
constrained by statute and regulation, possibly leading these funds to make financing 
choices that are not commonly observed elsewhere and are therefore little studied, and 3) 
there is evidence that the ownership structure and clientele of closed-end funds differs 
from that of operating firms.
hi contrast to industrial firms, but similar to utilities, the shares of closed-end 
funds show little reaction to announcements of either rights offerings or firm commitment 
offerings. This result fits existing models of securities issuance under conditions of 
adverse selection. The market appears to be efficient insofar as, while industrial firms may 
hold private information, mutual funds apparently do not. However, contrary to adverse 
selection models, and previous evidence on utility companies, funds display strong price 
runups prior to issue. These runups coincide with market runups but also reflect strong 
relative performance, as evidenced in part by significant positive movements in fund 
discounts in the year prior to issue. Fund managers also seem to have 'timing' ability in 
that the superior performance does not appear to extend beyond the announcement date. 
One interpretation of these phenomena is that fund managers exploit an readily observable 
indicator of firm valuation that is not available to the managers of operating firms: the
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fund's discount or premium to net asset value. That is, fund managers tap the capital 
markets after the fund’s discount/premium has moved in a positive direction such that the 
market can be said to be valuing the firm at more generous than usual levels.
Nontransferable rights have received no attention in the securities issuance 
literature. The fact that many closed-end equity issues feature nontransferable rights 
affords an opportunity to look for evidence of temporary (transactions costs-based) and 
permanent (demand curve) price pressure and to distinguish between the two. 
Nontransferable rights should involve higher transactions costs than transferable rights, 
hence more price pressure during the offering period. Thus, there is a joint hypothesis that 
transactions costs-based price pressure exists during the offering period, and that these 
transactions costs are higher when nontransferable rights are involved. This hypothesis is 
not supported by comparisons of offering period returns for the two types of rights, using 
either an event study regression model, or unadjusted returns during the offer period, or 
unadjusted returns controlled for issue size. Together with the finding that announcement 
returns are no more negative for nontransferable than for transferable rights (in fact, 
nontransferable announcement returns are significantly more positive, a finding for which 
no explanation is offered), it appears that nontransferability may have no special harmful 
effects on shareholders. For nontransferable but not for transferable rights, offering period 
returns are more negative when potential dilution costs are larger. This is the only 
evidence that nontransferable rights may involve higher transactions costs.
hi rights offerings, the existence of temporary price pressure is indicated if 
negative returns during the offering period are followed by a price recovery after the offer
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expires. This study finds either a partial price recovery (+0.97% for the 5 days after 
expiration, compared to negative offering period returns of -4.18%), or no recovery at all 
(using 20 days after expiration). This suggests the possible existence of a downward 
sloping demand curve for the fund's shares, especially to the extent that the negative 
returns are greater than probable transactions costs (Shleifer, 1986). The average -4.39% 
return on fund discounts (Table 14) that is found for a more encompassing period from 
just before announcement to a point three weeks after expiration provides more supporting 
evidence for the permanent price pressure hypothesis. If the idea of permanent price 
pressure and a downward-sloping demand curve effect is accepted, there is a corollary 
conclusion about the degree of substitutability for the shares of closed-end funds. That is, 
there may be a very limited clientele for these funds, and limited substitutability even 
between seemingly similar closed-end funds.
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